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In recent years, a range of initiatives have been introduced to provide patients with access to 
medicines outside of traditional regulatory and/or funding channels; we term these processes 
“accelerated access to medicines”. These generally take one of three forms- those that provide 
access by making existing regulatory and funding processes more efficient; those that provide access 
despite uncertainties surrounding safety or efficacy; and those that provide access despite 
uncertainties surrounding cost-effectiveness. These latter two types are the subject of intense 
debate, as they generally require us to suspend or override accepted standards of evidence of 
safety, effectiveness and/or cost-effectiveness. Ethical analysis provides valuable insights into these 
debates and highlights the risks and benefits that may accrue as a consequence of different 
accelerated access schemes. In this paper, we use the principle-based approach to ethical analysis 
described by Beauchamp and Childress (sometimes called the “four principles approach” because it 
frames analysis by reference to beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy and justice) to analyse 
initiatives that provide accelerated access to medicines. We identify a number of ethical issues that 
may arise in the context of accelerated access initiatives, including potential patient harms, impacts 
on patient autonomy and informed consent, and effects on research and regulatory systems. The 
complex ethical issues at play emphasise that there is no single answer to questions as to whether 
such schemes are ‘ethical’; rather, ethical principles will need balancing, context will be critically 
important, and discussion among the various stakeholder groups will be needed to reach an 
“ethically good” outcome.  
 
Keywords: bioethics, pharmaceutical funding decisions, pharmaceutical regulation, coverage with 
evidence development, investigational drugs  
 
 
The Move Towards Accelerated Access  
 
Pharmacotherapies are essential for the treatment of many conditions; however, a number of 
processes must usually occur before patients can access new medicines. Firstly, medicines that meet 
required standards of safety and efficacy must be approved for use by regulators such as US Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA), the European Medicines Agency (EMA) or Australia’s Therapeutic 
Goods Administration (TGA). The high cost of many therapies means that some form of subsidy is 
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required before all but the wealthiest patients can access these. A number of jurisdictions therefore 
provide subsidised access to medicines through publically funded healthcare systems such as US 
Centre for Medicare and Medicaid, the UK’s National Health Service (NHS) and Australia’s 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS). Health technology assessment (HTA) agencies such as 
Australia’s Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee (PBAC) and the UK’s National Institute for 
Health and Care Excellence (NICE) assess the clinical and cost-effectiveness of new therapies when 
determining whether coverage is provided through these schemes.  
 
For the most part, patients have had to wait for these processes to run their course before accessing 
therapies—the only real alternative being access through clinical trials. However, in recent years, 
there has been an increasing emphasis on initiatives that allow patients to access therapies outside 
of these traditional regulatory and/or funding processes; we collectively term these “accelerated 
access to medicines”. There are a number of reasons for this growing demand for accelerated 
access. Firstly, patients, clinicians and members of the pharmaceutical industry have raised concerns 
about the time taken for new therapies to reach the market, and view existing processes as too 
cumbersome to meaningfully assist patients with limited life expectancy1. It has been estimated that 
the average time taken to develop a new medicine and bring it to market is more than 12 years2. A 
recent Australian government report3 found that average approval times for new medicines were 
304 days for FDA, 478 days for EMA and 391 days for TGA. Assessment by HTA bodies to determine 
coverage can further increase the time taken for patients to access new therapies. As an example, 
the average time from regulatory approval to a positive coverage decision for oncology medicines in 
Australia was estimated to be 31 months in 20124. Existing processes are also seen as too rigid in 
terms of evidence requirements (for example, the emphasis on high quality randomised controlled 
trial evidence by both payers and regulators) and cost-effectiveness thresholds. Adherence to these 
thresholds is seen by many as a “road block” to patients accessing promising therapies4. Critics often 
point to the time taken for medicines that have proven to be safe and efficacious, and that have 
subsequently become part of standard practice, to be approved or funded in particular jurisdictions 
as evidence of the need for change.  
 
There are many different forms of accelerated access, not all of which can be discussed in detail in 
this article. However, accelerated access schemes can be broadly classified according to whether or 
not they have received formal regulatory approval. For medicines that have not yet received 
regulatory approval, patients may be given access through pharmaceutical company expanded 
access or compassionate use programs5 and other “special access” schemes  or “early access” 
programs (such as those in Australia6, Canada7 and France8, which allow for the importation and 
supply of unapproved therapies at the request of the patient’s physician). Many jurisdictions also 
have mechanisms in place that allow for the faster approval of new medicines. The FDA has four 
distinct approaches to speed the availability of new drugs that treat serious diseases, and fill an 
unmet clinical need or represent an advantage over currently available therapy (these programs are 
referred to as priority review, breakthrough therapy, accelerated approval and fast track)9. The 
EMA’s conditional marketing authorisation (CMA)10 and approval under exceptional circumstances11 
fulfil a similar purpose. There have been calls to introduce a similar scheme in Australia3,12. In some 
cases, ongoing marketing approval is conditional upon further evidence being generated. 
 
For medicines that have been approved by regulators but not (yet) funded, patients may receive 
subsidy through hospitals, private health insurers or through pharmaceutical company access 
programs6. A number of formal programs have also been established to provide funding for 
medicines that have not been deemed to be cost-effective by HTA agencies; examples include the 
UK’s Cancer Drugs Fund13 and Australia’s Herceptin14 and Life Saving Drugs programs15.  
There has also been considerable interest in the use of managed entry schemes (also known as risk-
sharing agreements or patient access schemes). These involve an agreement between a 
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pharmaceutical company and a healthcare payer to enable provisional or conditional coverage of 
promising health technologies16.  
 
Of particular interest is coverage with evidence development (CED), which allows for coverage of a 
therapy at a price justified by the evidence available when a decision is made. Ongoing coverage and 
the final price paid is dependent upon the collection of additional evidence (either through the 
completion of clinical trials or “real world” evidence once the therapy reaches the market place). A 
variety of such CED schemes have been implemented by healthcare payers around the globe. A 
number of healthcare payers, including the Centres for Medicare and Medicaid17, the UK 
Department of Health18 and Australian Government Department of Health19, have frameworks in 
place to allow for the use of coverage with evidence development. Recent studies have examined 
schemes instituted in Italy and the UK for the funding of new oncology drugs between 2006 and 
201420, those implemented across Europe between 2006 and 2012 for the funding of orphan drugs21 
and those implemented in Australia, New Zealand and South Korea to July 201216. Examples of 
medicines that have recently been made available under Australia’s Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme 
using coverage with evidence development include crizotinib for the treatment of locally advanced 
or metastatic non-small cell lung cancer22 and pembrolizumab and trametinib for the treatment of 
unresectable stage 3 or 4 malignant melanoma23,24. 
 
Despite these developments at both regulatory and funding levels, there are calls to further increase 
accelerated access to medicines. A number of US states are considering or have introduced “right to 
try” laws, enabling patients to request access to unapproved therapies from a pharmaceutical 
company without the need for FDA approval25. The EMA is currently undertaking a medicines 
adaptive pathways to patients (MAPP) pilot26 for the licensing of treatments in areas of high medical 
need. This utilises an iterative approach to drug development and licensing and emphasises the use 
of “real world” data to supplement evidence gained through clinical trials and the early involvement 
of regulators, HTA agencies and patients in a medicine’s development. US 21st Century Cures Act 
(which passed the house in 2015) contains a variety of provisions that aim to speed the approval of 
drugs and medical devices27. A number of recent government reviews have also examined ways to 
provide faster access to new treatments. A 2015 Australian Senate enquiry looked at the availability 
of new, innovative and specialist cancer drugs12 while a 2014 enquiry examined the appropriateness 
of Australia’s current regulatory system28. A UK government review is looking at ways to “speed up 
access to innovative drugs, devices and diagnostics for NHS patients”29.  
 
It is clear from the above that there are a number of initiatives that have been introduced to 
facilitate accelerated access to medicines, and that these initiatives might soon be extended. In 
general, these initiatives fall into three categories: those that provide access by making existing 
regulatory and funding processes more efficient; those that provide access despite uncertainties 
surrounding the safety or efficacy of a drug and those that provide access despite uncertainties 
surrounding cost-effectiveness of a drug. The first type is relatively uncontroversial, raising questions 
about how agencies utilise their resources. However, initiatives of the second and third type are 
more problematic as they require us to override—or at least put on hold—accepted standards of 
evidence of safety, effectiveness and/or cost-effectiveness.  
 
Concerns about such compromises are beginning to emerge. For example, a group of prominent 
physicians in Europe wrote a public letter condemning the EMA’s MAPP pilot project30; it has also 
been criticised by a group of European healthcare policy and stakeholder organisations including 
Health Action International (HAI) and the Nordic Cochrane Centre31. Many physicians, including the 
FDA commissioner, have questioned the impact of the provisions of the 21st Century Cures Act on 
the FDA’s ability to ensure the safety and effectiveness of new drugs and devices27,32 while a recent 
survey found that a majority of Americans oppose changing government safety and effectiveness 
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standards to allow for faster approval of new medicines33. With the current push towards 
accelerated access worldwide, it seems likely that such concerns will intensify, and that debates 
about accelerated access will become increasingly heated. 
 
Ethical Analysis of Accelerated Access  
 
One way to understand and progress debates of this kind is to subject them to ethical analysis. 
Ethics is the study of what we ought to do, rather than what we can do34. It allows us to examine 
complex phenomena, such as the availability of healthcare interventions and the allocation of 
healthcare resources, and to identify potential benefits and problems of various actions. A popular 
approach to ethical analysis is “principle-based ethics”. This involves the specification of a number of 
rules or “principles” that guide moral actions34. In bioethics, the most notable framework for 
principle-based ethics is the “four principles” approach developed by Tom Beauchamp and James 
Childress35. Beauchamp and Childress elucidated four principles that must be considered in order to 
make “ethically justifiable” decisions: autonomy, or that people should be allowed to be self-
governing and make decisions for themselves; justice, or that all available goods be shared fairly; 
beneficence, or the primacy of the welfare of patients and non-maleficence, or the duty to avoid 
doing harm. Each principle is prima facie, meaning that there is a duty to comply with it unless it is 
overridden by another duty. Importantly, there is no hierarchy of principles- each is potentially of 
equal importance and needs to be balanced with all others, and principles may be given different 
priority by different people in different situations.  
 
In this paper, we will apply this “four principles” approach to initiatives that provide accelerated 
access to medicines. We emphasise that our objective is to illustrate the range of issues that may be 
raised when implementing initiatives that provide accelerated access to medicines and that need to 
be addressed by policy-makers in order to achieve an “ethically good” outcome. Not all issues will be 
relevant to every type of scheme, and the way that the principles are balanced will vary depending 
on the initiative in question.  
 
Beneficence and Non-Maleficence  
The primary ethical argument for accelerated access is that patients in desperate situations—such as 
those suffering from life-threatening illness or rare diseases for which there are no available 
treatment options—should have timely access to potentially beneficial therapies. Additionally, 
providing hope of a cure to desperate patients (even if this subsequently turns out to be ‘false’) is 
another possible form of beneficence. The “rule of rescue” is an associated justification. This refers 
to an imperative that people feel to rescue identifiable individuals facing avoidable death36 and is a 
powerful moral norm in many Western societies and major religious traditions37.  
 
There are, however, a number of risks associated with accelerated access. Firstly, there is the 
possibility that patients will be exposed to ineffective or unsafe treatments. One well-known 
example is the angiogenesis inhibitor bevacizumab (marketed as Avastin). This was granted 
accelerated approval by the FDA for HER2-negative breast cancer in 2008; however, this was revoked 
in 2011 when further follow-up showed no survival benefits and several side effects38.  
 
In this regard, it is important to be aware that, once a drug is on the market and patients and 
clinicians become familiar with the technology, regulatory withdrawal and/or disinvestment is 
unlikely to occur. If it does, it is likely to take time and be fiercely resisted by pharmaceutical 
companies and patients for whom the treatment has been effective39. The FDA commenced the 
process of removing the breast cancer indication from the product label of bevacizumab in 
December 201040 but this was not completed until June 201138. This means that by the time 
products are removed from the market, large numbers of patients may have been exposed to an 
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unsafe or ineffective therapy. A recent study examined the rates of prescribing of 17 drugs that were 
approved and subsequently withdrawn from the US market due to safety concerns between 1993 
and 201041; it was estimated that, collectively, these drugs were prescribed 112 million times before 
they were withdrawn. While this problem is not specific to accelerated access, it is a reminder of the 
potential dangers of premature market access. 
 
In addition to harming patients, accelerated access can also impact negatively on future research. 
Access prior to registration (for example, through “right to try” laws or industry expanded access or 
compassionate use programs) has the potential to limit the number of patients and/or products 
available for trials and may not result in further data collection. Meanwhile, conditional registration 
or coverage with evidence development might reduce the incentive for companies to spend money 
conducting late stage clinical trials if “real world” data (for example, patient registries or 
administrative databases) could be gathered instead. It may also be difficult to convince patients to 
enrol in clinical trials once a drug is widely available39.  
 
The use of “real world” data can also be problematic. The associated observational research 
methods must be carefully designed to minimise bias and confounding effects. The pharmaceutical 
company responsible for the collection of further evidence may not control the data needed to do 
so, and so cooperation between funding agencies, sponsoring companies, clinicians, administrators 
and insurers is essential39. Concerns have also been raised about the willingness of pharmaceutical 
companies to complete required post-marketing research and the ability of regulators and payers to 
monitor and respond to issues identified during regulatory or funding approval processes. For 
example, a report by US Government Accountability Office found that less than half of the post-
marketing studies that the FDA had required as a condition of approval had been completed by the 
set deadline, while the FDA was behind in tracking safety issues identified during the approval 
process and reviewing submitted data42.  
 
It is possible to design schemes to overcome many of these difficulties. One example is France’s AcSe 
program43. The scheme, introduced in 2013, aims to provide treatment recommendations based on 
the presence of relevant biological markers for malignancies for which no targeted therapy is 
available. Genetic testing is carried out nationwide to identify patients who could potentially benefit 
from targeted anticancer therapies which are in advanced development and approaching marketing 
authorisation for alternative indications. Patients identified as having a relevant biomarker are then 
enrolled in a phase 2 trial examining the activity of the drug in a variety of cancer sub-types. Patients 
who are eligible for other industry- or academic-sponsored clinical trials exploring the effectiveness 
of a drug with the same target are not eligible to participate. The first two drugs to be evaluated 
under this program are crizotinib and vemurafenib.  
 
Another possible harm associated with accelerated access is the encouragement of “false hope”. 
This is most problematic for patients using investigational drugs, as the probability of obtaining a 
clinically meaningful benefit from early-stage clinical trials has been estimated to be less than 10%44, 
although it is a potential problem for any drug that is approved on the basis of less complete data. It 
is relevant that, in a recent study examining cancer drugs approved by the FDA on the basis of 
surrogate endpoints between 2008 and 2012, it was found that the majority had unknown effects 
on, or did not improve, overall survival45.   
 
Autonomy 
It has been argued by proponents of accelerated access that it is up to patients and their physicians, 
not regulators, to determine whether it is reasonable to try a particular therapy46. Patients are 
presumed to be capable of making well-informed decisions in consultation with their physicians and 
are entitled to use their own risk-benefit thresholds when deciding to use a particular treatment47.  
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However, a number of factors limit a patient’s ability to give informed consent. The risks and harms 
of a new therapy may be unclear at the time that a patient wishes to access it. “Right to try” laws, 
for example, allow patients to request access to therapies that have successfully completed phase 1 
safety tests. These are conducted in small groups of up to 20 patients and are not designed to 
identify all possible adverse effects or to provide information about the effectiveness of a therapy. 
Patients and their physicians may not have access to all information available about a therapy, as 
much of this is proprietary and not available to people outside the pharmaceutical company. 
Patients may also lack the skills to interpret complex pharmaceutical information (although 
physicians can assist with this) or may not fully comprehend the risk that use of the therapy entails.  
 
Justice  
A major argument for accelerated access to medicines is that particular groups of patients, such as 
those with rare diseases or subsets of diseases, are “left behind” compared to other patient groups, 
as a result of the difficulty of conducting clinical trials in small patient populations, the difficulty of 
demonstrating cost-effectiveness in order to obtain subsidy from both public and private payers, and 
the need for companies to charge more for treatments in order to recoup their investment48. 
However, these inequities may persist even if accelerated access is provided, as patients with rare 
diseases are also less likely to be able to access treatment through alternative pathways such as 
hospital funding schemes or industry compassionate access schemes3. Whilst this is not an argument 
against providing accelerated access in these circumstances, it should be remembered that this may 
not be sufficient to overcome the disadvantages that these patients face.  
 
It has also been argued that allowing earlier market access for products that meet an unmet clinical 
need rewards and encourages further drug development in these areas by allowing companies to 
recoup their investment earlier49. It is, however, unclear whether current initiatives meet these 
aims. One recent study10 found that Europe’s conditional marketing authorisation did not reduce the 
development time from first in-human testing to marketing authorisation. Additionally, it has been 
argued that these mechanisms may be used by companies as a “rescue option” when submitted 
data do not support a full marketing authorisation, rather than a pathway to facilitate earlier access 
to new therapies. The Australian government’s “Framework for the Introduction of a Managed Entry 
Scheme” was introduced in 2010; however, to date only a small number of medicines have been 
listed on the pharmaceutical benefits scheme using coverage with evidence development50. 
Additionally, two recent studies31,45 have examined the innovativeness of new drugs approved 
through accelerated approval pathways and suggest that only a small proportion represent 
significant therapeutic innovations.  
 
With respect to coverage with evidence development, disregarding usual cost-effectiveness 
thresholds can have serious consequences for healthcare systems. It is not unusual for new cancer 
treatments to cost in excess of $100 000 per patient per year of treatment51. Additionally, 
expenditure on pharmaceuticals is increasing in many jurisdictions while the global cost of medicines 
is expected to reach US$1.2 trillion by 201752. Increased spending on new pharmacotherapies has 
significant opportunity costs, particularly in systems with a capped healthcare budget (for example, 
New Zealand’s PHARMAC53 and England’s NHS54). The recent changes to the UK’s Cancer Drugs Fund 
provide a salient example. After exceeding its budget by 50% during 201455, the fund was converted 
to a managed entry scheme, which will provide funding for therapies for two years while further 
data is gathered to enable a final coverage recommendation56.  
 
Finally, most managed entry agreements contain confidentiality clauses that result in a lack of 
transparency surrounding drug prices and present challenges for countries that rely on external 
reference pricing20,50. These are typically low to middle income countries that do not have well-
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organised systems or sufficient bargaining power to negotiate lower prices. There is concern that 
“secret” rebates or discounts could increase inequities in access to medicines between jurisdictions.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Our analysis has shown that, while there are many good arguments for accelerated access, there are 
also a number of potential harms that need to be considered, including physical harm to patients, 
impacts on patient autonomy and informed consent, and effects on research, regulatory and health 
systems. Importantly, the complex ethical issues at play make it clear that there is unlikely to ever be 
a rule-based solution or single correct answer to the question of whether accelerated access is 
“right” or “wrong”. Instead, careful balancing of ethical principles, consideration of the context of 
each initiative under consideration and ongoing discussion among the various stakeholder groups 
will be needed in order to reach an “ethically good” outcome in each case. Importantly, the range of 
stakeholder views on access to medicines mean that analysis and evaluation from multiple 
stakeholder perspectives must occur in order to achieve timely and safe access in the most ethical 
way possible.  
 
References: 
 
1. Bateman-House A, Kimberly L, Redman B, Dubler N, Caplan A. Right-to-try laws: hope, hype, 
and unintended consequences. Annals of internal medicine. 2015;163(10):796. 
2. Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry Development of New Medicines 
http://www.abpi.org.uk/industry-info/new-medicines/pages/default.aspx. Accessed 1st 
September, 2016. 
3. Sansom L, Delaat W, Horvath J. Review of Medicines and Medical Devices Regulation: Report 
on the regulatory framework for medicines and medical devices. Canberra 2015. 
4. Access to Cancer Medicines in Australia Medicines Australia;2013. 
5. Finkelstein P. Expanded Access to Investigational Drugs: What Physicians and the Public 
Need to Know About FDA and Corporate Processes. AMA Journal of Ethics 2015;17(12):1142-
1146. 
6. Gallego G, Taylor SJ, Brien J-aE. Provision of pharmaceuticals in Australian hospitals: equity 
of access? Pharmacy World & Science. 2007;29(2):47-50. 
7. Urbinati D, Toumi M. EARLY ACCESS PROGRAMMES (EAPS): REVIEW OF NON-EUROPEAN 
SYSTEM. VALUE IN HEALTH. 2012;15(7):A308-A308. 
8. Urbinati D, Toumi M. EARLY ACCESS PROGRAMMES (EAPS): REVIEW OF THE EUROPEAN 
SYSTEM. VALUE IN HEALTH. 2012;15(7):A315-A315. 
9. US Food and Drug Administration: Fast Track, Breakthrough Therapy, Accelerated Approval, 
Priority Review. 2015; http://www.fda.gov/forpatients/approvals/fast/ucm20041766.htm. 
Accessed 5th July 2016. 
10. Hoekman J, Boon WPC, Bouvy JC, Ebbers HC, de Jong JP, De Bruin ML. Use of the conditional 
marketing authorization pathway for oncology medicines in Europe. Clinical Pharmacology & 
Therapeutics. 2015;98(5):534-541. 
11. Boon WPC, Moors EHM, Meijer A, Schellekens H. Conditional Approval and Approval Under 
Exceptional Circumstances as Regulatory Instruments for Stimulating Responsible Drug 
Innovation in Europe. Clinical Pharmacology & Therapeutics. 2010;88(6):848-853. 
12. Australian Senate Community Affairs Reference Committee: Availability of New, Innovative 
and Specialist Cancer Drugs in Australia Canberra Australian Government 2015. 
13. Macaulay R. The cancer drugs fund: A systematic analysis of the requirements for inclusion 
on the English national list of drugs for priority funding. Value in Health. 2014;17(7):A659. 
8 |  P a g e
 
14. Medicare Australia : Late stage metastatic breast cancer. 2015; 
http://www.medicareaustralia.gov.au/provider/patients/late-breast-cancer.jsp. Accessed 
27th September 2015 2015. 
15. Medicare Australia: Life Saving Drugs Program (LSDP) 2016; http://www.health.gov.au/LSDP. 
16. Lu CY, Lupton C, Rakowsky S, Babar Z-U-D, Ross-Degnan D, Wagner AK. Patient access 
schemes in Asia-pacific markets: current experience and future potential. Journal of 
pharmaceutical policy and practice. 2015;8(1):6-6. 
17. Guidance for the Public, Industry, and CMS Staff: Coverage with Evidence Development.  
https://www.cms.gov/medicare-coverage-database/details/medicare-coverage-document-
details.aspx?MCDId=27. Accessed 27th September 2015, 2015. 
18. Hints and tips for companies considering a Patient Access Scheme (PAS) proposal in England. 
2015; 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/217037/P
AS-Good-Practice-Guidance.pdf. Accessed 27th September 2015, 2015. 
19. Australian Government Department of Health Framework for the introduction of a Managed 
Entry Scheme for submissions to the Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee. 2015; 
http://www.pbs.gov.au/info/publication/factsheets/shared/framework-for-introduction-of-
managed-entry-scheme-for-PBAC-submissions. Accessed 27th September 2015, 2015. 
20. van de Vooren K, Curto A, Freemantle N, Garattini L. Market-access agreements for anti-
cancer drugs. Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine. 2015;108(5):166-170. 
21. Morel T, Arickx F, Befrits G, et al. Reconciling uncertainty of costs and outcomes with the 
need for access to orphan medicinal products: a comparative study of managed entry 
agreements across seven European countries. Orphanet Journal of Rare Diseases. 
2013;8:198-212. 
22. Crizotinib (Xalkori®) Managed Entry Scheme for listing on the Pharmaceutical Benefits 
Scheme – information for patients. 2015; 
http://www.pbs.gov.au/info/news/2015/08/crizotinib-xalkori-managed-entry-scheme-info-
2015-08. Accessed 27th September 2015, 2015. 
23. Australian Government Department of Health The Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme 
Pembrolizumab - information for patients. 2015; 
http://www.pbs.gov.au/info/news/2015/09/pembrolizumab-keytruda-mes-pbs-patient-info. 
Accessed 29th July 2016, 2016. 
24. Australian Government Department of Health The Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme 
Trametinib (Mekinist®) Managed Entry Scheme for listing on the Pharmaceutical Benefits 
Scheme – information for patients. 2015; 
http://www.pbs.gov.au/info/news/2015/08/trametinib-managed-entry-scheme-info-2015-
08. Accessed 29th July, 2016. 
25. Mason M. Lawmaker to Retry 'Right-to-Try' Bill to Let Gravely Ill Access Experimental Drugs 
LA Times 13 January 2016, 2016. 
26. European Medicines Agency: Adaptive Pathways. 2016; 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/ema/index.jsp?curl=pages/regulation/general/general_content
_000601.jsp. Accessed 5th July, 2016. 
27. Mixter B. Bloomberg BNA: FDA head cites concerns with cures bill 2016; 
http://www.bna.com/fda-head-cites-b57982070805/. Accessed 5th July 2016. 
28. Australian Government Department of Health: Expert Review of Medicines and Medical 
Devices http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/Expert-Review-of-
Medicines-and-Medical-Devices-Regulation. Accessed 5th July, 2016. 
29. Accelerated Access Review 2016; 
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/accelerated-access-review. Accessed 5th 
July 2016, 2016. 
9 |  P a g e
 
30. European Public Health Alliance: Scientists Voice Concerns Over Adaptive Pathways.  
http://epha.org/scientists-voice-concerns-about-adaptive-pathways/. Accessed 5th July 
2016. 
31. 'Adaptive Licensing' or 'Adaptive Pathways': Deregulation Under the Guise of Earlier Access. 
Brussels: Health Action International (HAI), The International Society of Drug Bulletins (ISDB), 
The Medicines in Europe Forum (MiEF), The Mario Negri Institute for Pharmacological 
Research, The Nordic Cochrane Centre, WEMOS; 16 October 2015 2015. 
32. Sarpatwari A, Kesselheim AS. The 21st century cures act: Opportunities and challenges. 
Clinical Pharmacology & Therapeutics. 2015;98(6):575-577. 
33. Nather D, Kaplan S. STAT News: Public wary of faster approvals of new drugs, STAT-Harvard 
poll finds 2016; https://www.statnews.com/2016/05/11/stat-harvard-poll-drug-approvals/. 
Accessed 5th July, 2016. 
34. Kerridge IH, Lowe M, Stewart C. Ethics and law for the health professions. Vol 4th. 
Annandale, N.S.W: Federation Press; 2013. 
35. Beauchamp TL, Childress JF. Principles of biomedical ethics. Vol 7th. New York: Oxford 
University Press; 2013. 
36. McKie J, Richardson J. The rule of rescue. Soc Sci Med. 2003;56(12):2407-2419. 
37. Caplan A, Moch K. Health Affairs Blog: Rescue Me: The Challenge Of Compassionate Use In 
The Social Media Era. 2014; http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2014/08/27/rescue-me-the-
challenge-of-compassionate-use-in-the-social-media-era/. Accessed 13th July, 2016. 
38. FDA Commissioner announces Avastin decision: Drug not shown to be safe and effective in 
breast cancer patients.  
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm280536.htm. 
39. Lewis JRR, Kerridge I, Lipworth W. Coverage With Evidence Development and Managed 
Entry in the Funding of Personalized Medicine: Practical and Ethical Challenges for Oncology. 
Journal of clinical oncology : official journal of the American Society of Clinical Oncology. 
2015;33(34):4112. 
40. FDA begins process to remove breast cancer indication from Avastin label: Drug not shown 
to be safe and effective in breast cancer patients.  
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm237172.htm. 
Accessed 6th July, 2016. 
41. Saluja S, Woolhandler S, Himmelstein DU, Bor D, McCormick D. Unsafe Drugs Were 
Prescribed More Than One Hundred Million Times in the United States Before Being 
Recalled. International journal of health services : planning, administration, evaluation. 
2016. 
42. Dyer O. FDA fails to monitor fast tracked drugs after approval, says US watchdog. BMJ 
(Clinical research ed). 2016;532:i371. 
43. Buzyn A, Blay J-Y, Hoog-Labouret N, et al. Equal access to innovative therapies and precision 
cancer care. Nature reviews Clinical oncology. 2016;13(6):385-393. 
44. Horstmann E, McCabe MS, Grochow L, et al. Risks and Benefits of Phase 1 Oncology Trials, 
1991 through 2002. The New England Journal of Medicine. 2005;352(9):895-904. 
45. Kim C, Prasad V. Cancer Drugs Approved on the Basis of a Surrogate End Point and 
Subsequent Overall Survival: An Analysis of 5 Years of US Food and Drug Administration 
Approvals. JAMA internal medicine. 2015;175(12):1992. 
46. Dresser R. “Right to Try” Laws: The Gap between Experts and Advocates. Hastings Center 
Report. 2015;45(3):9-10. 
47. Darrow JJ, Sarpatwari A, Avorn J, Kesselheim AS. Practical, legal, and ethical issues in 
expanded access to investigational drugs. The New England journal of medicine. 
2015;372(3):279-286. 
48. Joppi R, Gerardi C, Bertele V, Garattini S. Letting post-marketing bridge the evidence gap: the 
case of orphan drugs. BMJ (Clinical research ed). 2016;353:i2978. 
10 |  P a g e
 
49. Sharma A, Jacob A, Tandon M, Kumar D. Orphan drug: Development trends and strategies. 
Journal of Pharmacy and Bioallied Sciences. 2010;2(4):290-299. 
50. Vitry A, Roughead E. Managed entry agreements for pharmaceuticals in Australia. Health 
policy (Amsterdam, Netherlands). 2014;117(3):345-352. 
51. Chustecka Z. High Price of Cancer Drugs Is Harming Patients. Medscape Medical News 2013. 
52. The Global Use of Medicines: Outlook through 2017. IMS Institution 2013. 
53. Manning J. Priority-setting processes for medicines: the United Kingdom, Australia and New 
Zealand. Journal of law and medicine. 2011;18(3):439. 
54. NHS Choices: The NHS in England.  
http://www.nhs.uk/NHSEngland/thenhs/about/Pages/overview.aspx. Accessed 6th July, 
2016. 
55. Cancer drugs fund 'is not sustainable' after exceeding its budget by 50% to help 74,000 
patients receive life-saving treatments not approved by NHS watchdog. Daily Mail UK 18th 
September 2015. 
56. Mayor S. New "managed access" process for Cancer Drugs Fund to go ahead, NHS England 
confirms. BMJ (Clinical research ed). 2016;352:i1208. 
 
 
